The Naval Mutinies of 1798 - The Irish Plot to Seize the Channel Fleet

Victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 is universally acknowledged as the most celebrated achievement in the illustrious history of the Royal Navy. The seamanship, discipline and determination of the ordinary seamen aboard the British ships have been much applauded. By contrast, in 1797, the major mutinies which had taken place at Spithead and at The Nore portray a navy riven with discontent and disharmony. Meanwhile, in Ireland, there was continuing unrest against English rule. Prompted by the success of the French Revolution, there were hopes that a French army could be landed in Southern Ireland with the eventual aim of liberating the whole island. Amongst other plans, an underground organisation, the Society of United Irishmen, wanted to encourage mutiny particularly aboard warships of the Channel Fleet, sail them to Brest and join Britain’s enemy. The intention was that the sizeable proportion of Irishmen among most of the ships’ crews at the time, led by known supporters and bolstered by others sympathetic to the revolutionary cause, would join them. The events of 1798, when a number of mostly unsuccessful mutinies were attempted both in the English Channel and elsewhere in the world, is the subject of Philip Macdougall’s book. Ultimately, it is a story of failure, owing to several factors. Firstly, it proved nearly impossible to maintain secrecy without the ships’ officers learning about a possible rebellion. Sometimes, the mutineers resorted to climbing the rigging in order to hold private meetings. Secondly, there was the fear of reprisal if someone was even suspected of aiding a mutiny – in that respect the Navy was absolutely ruthless. The ringleaders were hanged, the ultimate punishment deliberately carried out in full view of the rest of the fleet or, for lesser crimes, were given the lash, again administered before a captive audience of their shipmates. Moreover, in the case of the few mutinies which did succeed, the perpetrators were doggedly hunted down, sometimes for years afterwards. The Irish sailors were often caught in a dilemma: fearing persecution by their own people if they failed join the cause or facing the punishments that followed if the mutiny failed. Macdougall’s research has included Admiralty records, newspaper articles of the time and importantly, the detailed minutes of courts martial. Particularly in the latter case, he has used the actual words spoken by the leading perpetrators and others to add dramatic immediacy to the narrative. This book is a stark reminder of the harsh, uncompromising world for the 18th Century sailor, which counterfactually might well have contributed to the ruthless efficiency shown by the British fleet at Trafalgar. Philip Macdougall does not spare the reader in his descriptions of the reality of a hanging or the administration of the cat-o-nine tails. In places the punishments topple over into sadism. Earl St. Vincent, the C-in-C Mediterranean, for instance, cruelly ordered mutineers to be hanged exclusively by their fellow crew members. Accounts of the failed Irish naval mutinies of 1798 have tended to be overshadowed by the events of the long Anglo-French war of the time. The author is to be congratulated for producing a very readable account of this otherwise little-known episode in the history of the Royal Navy during the late 18th Century.